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Abstract
This note analyzes the repeated interaction among buyers of a homogeneous good, in a
setting of imperfect buyer mobility. The buyers are assumed to play a dynamic game of
imperfect information: at each stage every buyer chooses which seller to visit without
knowing the current and past choices of the other buyers. A norm of conditional loyalty
might prevail, according to which buyers keep loyal if previously served. Under generalized
conditional loyalty, an efficient allocation is certainly reached in a finite number of stages.
There is a clear case for boundedly rational buyers to keep conditionally loyal. And, most
importantly, for the two−seller case we are able to establish adherence to a strategy of
conditional loyalty as an “assessment equilibrium” of the dynamic buyer game.
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1 Introduction
Buyers often develop attachment to sellers in such a way that the market
of similar goods is to some extent segmented into the particular markets
of the diﬀerent sellers. This feature has commonly been related to product
diﬀerentiation (Chamberlin, 1962, p. 69) or, more recently, to switching
costs arising from brand-specific learning (Klemperer, 1987). The present
paper shows that, even under product homogeneity, in a setting of imperfect
mobility the concern of buyers about service prospects is another possible
reason for loyalty. Other recent works also point to the possible emergence
of loyalty in a similar setting, though by a diﬀerent methodology. Kirman
and Vriend (2001) and Goldman, Kraus, and Shehory (2004)1 adopt a com-
putational approach with automated buyers and sellers. Kirman and Vriend
discover a significant pattern of conditional loyalty in the actual evolution
of a market where buyers and sellers behave adaptively. Goldman et al.
make simulations with alternative strategy profiles and find “experimental
equilibria” in which the buyers are conditionally loyal.
In the model below, there are n sellers that supply with fixed and equal
capacities a homogeneous good at the same, exogenously given price. To-
tal capacity equals m, the number of buyers. At each stage every buyer
demands one unit and chooses independently which of the n sellers to visit
without knowing the choices previously made by the other buyers. Thus we
are concerned with a dynamic game of imperfect information that is played
by the m buyers when prices are set equal by the n sellers. The interesting
question is whether one can expect, without any coordination, that some
eﬃcient allocation of buyers will nonetheless be reached. In spite of there
being many such allocations, this turns out to be a concrete possibility. The
buyers might obey a norm that prescribes keeping loyal if previously served
and switching to any seller never tried before if rationed. When this norm
of conditional loyalty prevails, then an eﬃcient allocation will certainly be
reached in a finite number of stages. Two possible explanations are given
for adherence to such a norm. The first one is in terms of boundedly ra-
tional buyers who derive expectations about service prospects from their
most recent experience with any seller already tried. Alternatively, condi-
tional loyalty may look rewarding to buyers who recognize their strategic
interdependence. More specifically, looking for equilibria of the dynamic
buyer game we develop a notion of “assessment equilibrium” that is closely
1Kirman and Vriend (p. 464) and Goldman et al. (pp. 331-332) discuss diﬀerences in
methodology and assumptions with our earlier work on the topic (De Francesco, 1996 and
1998).
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related to Kreps and Wilson’s (1987) sequential equilibrium. In fact, for the
two-seller case we are able to prove that it is an assessment equilibrium for
the m buyers to adhere to a strategy incorporating the norm of conditional
loyalty.
2 The static buyer game
Let M = {1, ..., h, ...,m} and N = {1, ..., i, ..., n} be the set of buyers and
sellers, respectively, with m/n = λ integer. The sellers produce the same
indivisible good at some price p < 1, 1 being the buyer’s reservation price.
Every buyer demands one unit and every seller has capacity λ, hence total
capacity and demand are both equal tom. The buyers choose simultaneously
which seller to visit. In this section this choice is made once and for all. Thus
the pure strategy set available to each buyer is Sh = {sh} = N , where sh = i
is the action of visiting seller i by buyer h. This reflects the assumption that
switching seller is too costly for a buyer who gets rationed. A pure strategy
profile for the m buyers is written as s = (s1, ..., sh, ..., sm) and a strategy
profile for all k 6= h is written as s−h. Any s leads to a vector of demands
for the n sellers, m = (m1, ...,mi, ...,mn), where mi = #{h : sh = i}. Also,bmi = #{k 6= h : sk = i} is the number of all buyers but h who visit seller
i. Production takes place on demand, hence seller i produces min{mi,λ}. If
mi > λ, then the seller chooses randomly which buyers to serve. Denote by
πh(s) buyer h’s service probability at s: then πh(s) = min{1,λ/(bmi + 1)}
for any h : sh = i. The buyers are risk neutral, so each h seeks to maximize
expected surplus (1−p)πh(sh, s−h) and hence πh(sh, s−h). The pure strategy
equilibria (PSEs) of the static game are easily found.
Proposition 1 Any strategy profile s∗ : m∗i = λ for any i ∈ N is a PSE.
Proof. In the Appendix.
PSEs are eﬃcient (πh(s∗) = 1). There is a serious selection problem,
though: their number is Πn−1k=0
µ
m− kλ
λ
¶
, hence rapidly increasing in n
andm. Not surprisingly, recent analyses of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
(Peters, 1984 and 2000, Deneckere and Peck, 1995, Burdett, Shi, andWright,
2001) have assumed that, at the set prices, a mixed strategy equilibrium of
the buyer game is played when such an equilibrium exists. A mixed strategy
is a vector σ = (υ1, ...,υi, ..., υn), where υi is the probability that seller i is
visited by the buyer. A mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) is easily found.
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Proposition 2 All buyers playing σ∗ = ( 1n , ...,
1
n) is a MSE.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The MSE is clearly ineﬃcient: mismatchings between demands and ca-
pacities occur with positive probability so that πh(σ∗) < 1.
3 The dynamic buyer game
The buyers are now assumed to take repeat decisions over a large number of
stages. At each stage t = 1, ..., T, every buyer demands one unit and chooses
which seller to visit. This incorporates imperfect mobility in a simple way:
though too costly within a single stage, switching seller is costless from
one stage to the next. No buyer can observe the actions previously taken
by others, hence we have a dynamic game of imperfect information. For
simplicity, the buyers care only about current payoﬀs. As in the static
game, any rationing at a seller takes place randomly among forthcoming
buyers.
The most immediate solutions of the dynamic game are repeat playing
of any equilibrium of the static game. Then the coordination problem sor-
rounding PSEs would suggest that repetition of the MSE of the static game
gives a better prediction of the actual evolution of play. Yet a diﬀerent be-
havior might in principle prevail: rather than choosing the seller randomly
at every stage, the buyers might obey a norm of “conditional loyalty”.
DEFINITION 1 According to the norm of conditional loyalty, at
any t > 1 the buyer is loyal if served at t − 1, otherwise switching to any
seller he has never tried before (so long as there are any).
This norm is akin to a “reduced strategy” (as defined, e. g., by Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 94): it contains prescriptions to be adhered to so
long as the buyer has kept conditionally loyal over the past. More precisely,
it is part of a reduced strategy: its prescriptions are also incomplete in
another respect, since the rationed buyer is not told what to do in the event
he has been rationed by all sellers over the past.
Denote by m(t) = (m1(t), ...,mn(t)) the vector of the demands at stage t
and by µ(m(t)) the probability distribution of m(t), as valued at the start of
the game. Quite remarkably, with all buyers conditionally loyal an eﬃcient
allocation will certainly be reached in a finite number of stages.
Proposition 3 Let τ ≡ (m− λ+ 1) (n − 2) + 1. Then, under generalized
conditional loyalty: (i) µ(m(t) = (λ, ...,λ)) = 1 for all t > τ ;
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(ii) µ(m(t) = (λ, ...,λ)) < 1 for all t ≤ τ .
Proof. (i) With all buyers conditionally loyal, if mi(t − 1) ≤ λ then
mi(t) ≥ mi(t− 1). Thus no fewer buyers are served at t than at t− 1. Also,
it can be m(t) 6= (λ, ...,λ) only if m(t − 1) 6= (λ, ...,λ). Most important,
any buyer can at most be rationed n − 1 times. To see this, suppose that,
by some stage t − 1, buyer h has been rationed n − 1 times thus far and
denote by i the seller still to be tried by h. Note that bmj(t − 1) ≥ λ
for any j 6= i. Since bmi(t − 1) = m − 1 −Pj 6=i bmj(t − 1), we then havebmi(t − 1) ≤ m − 1 − (n − 1)λ = λ − 1. It follows from bmj(t − 1) ≥ λ
that bmj(t) ≥ λ, hence bmi(t) < λ. Thus h cannot be rationed any more.
Assume now that just one buyer is rationed at t = 1: e. g., m1(1) = λ+ 1,
m2(1) = ... = mn−1(1) = λ, and mn(1) = λ− 1. Note that the λ− 1 buyers
who visit seller n at t = 1 do not risk being rationed at any t > 1; the buyers
exposed to such a risk are the remaining m− λ+1 ones. Thus it cannot be
that m(t) 6= (λ, ...,λ) at t > (m− λ+ 1)(n− 2) + 1, otherwise at least one
buyer would have been rationed more that n− 1 times.2
(ii) In the Appendix.
In light of Prop. 3, the coordination needed to achieve some eﬃcient
allocation would gradually arise if the buyers were conditionally loyal. For
example, one can immediately check that, with two sellers, τ = 1 regardless
of the number of buyers: in the m × 2 case, two stages are enough for an
eﬃcient allocation to be reached with unit probability.
All the above leads to the question of whether the buyers may have an
individual incentive to be conditionally loyal. Let us begin with buyers who
neglect their strategic interaction. More specifically, we refer to a boundedly
rational buyer as one whose expectations are derived from his most recent
experience with every seller already tried.
DEFINITION 2 A boundedly rational buyer expects he would cur-
rently be served (rationed) at seller i if he was so on his last visit to i.
Then the following result is easily established.
Proposition 4 At any t > 1 boundedly rational buyers adhere to the norm
of conditional loyalty.
Proof. Let i be the seller visited by buyer h at the preceding stage t−1.
It follows immediately from Definition 2 that h keeps loyal to i if previously
2A fortiori it would be so if several buyers were rationed at t = 1.
4
served. If rationed at t−1, buyer h moves away from i while avoiding coming
back to any j 6= i he visited at some earlier stage (he was rationed on his
last visit to any such j, otherwise he would still be there at t− 1).
We now turn to fully rational buyers who optimize in the face of their
opponents’ strategies. Before doing this, let us clarify the main diﬀerence
in approach from Goldman et al. (2004). In their model automated buyers
and sellers interact repeatedly, each with a number of available actions at
each stage. In particular, a buyer might place his order randomly among
the sellers or condition his current choice on past service experience. A
large number of simulations are run for alternative strategy profiles, using
each agent’s average payoﬀ as an estimate of his expected payoﬀ. Then it is
checked whether there are gains from a unilateral deviation: if not, then the
strategy profile under consideration is an “experimental equilibrium”. One
result is that it is part of an “experimental equilibrium” for all the buyers
to keep loyal if previously served and to switch seller if rationed.
One motivation for their empirical approach is the diﬃculty of finding an
analytical solution for this game. It is worth, though, to explicitly address
this issue in order to see how much progress can be done in this classical
direction and where the main diﬃculties are.
To solve our dynamic game we propose developing a notion of equilibrium
that is closely related to Kreps and Wilson’s (1987) sequential equilibrium.
Denote by hsi (t) (h
r
i (t)) the event that buyer h is served (rationed) by seller
i at stage t. At each date t - just before stage t is played - h is at an in-
formation set, H(t). This is a (t− 1)-component vector describing h’s past
experience. For example, H(3) = (hr3(1), h
s
4(2)) states that h was rationed
by seller 3 at t = 1 and served by seller 4 at t = 2. Conditional onH(t) buyer
h has a belief on the past, that is, a probability distribution over histories
of the game thus far. An “assessment” is a profile of behavioral strategies
together with a system of beliefs. Our “assessment equilibrium”3 is an as-
sessment that meets the two basic requirements of “sequential rationality”
and “structural consistency”. The former stipulates that strategies be mu-
tual best responses: at each H(t), adhering to the equilibrium strategy is an
optimal response when all k 6= h are henceforth adhering to the equilibrium
strategy. Sequential rationality holds at any H(t) on the equilibrium path -
any H(t) that occurs with positive probability when the buyers have always
adhered to the equilibrium strategy - as well as at any H(t) oﬀ the equi-
librium path. “Structural consistency” is about coherence of beliefs with
3Binmore (1992) defines so a weakened version of sequential equilibrium.
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strategies, requiring that beliefs be derived using Bayes’ rule.4 If H(t) is on
the equilibrium path, then beliefs are derived by Bayes’ rule and the as-
sumption that all k 6= h have always adhered to the equilibrium strategy; at
H(t) oﬀ the equilibrium path, beliefs are derived by Bayes’ rule under some
alternative assumption about the strategies played by the other buyers.
In the remainder we are mainly concerned with the m × 2 case. Then
the norm of conditional loyalty is incorporated into the following strategy,
denoted by Θm×2.
DEFINITION 3 Θm×2 makes the following prescriptions: at t = 1 choose
either seller with probability 12 ; at any H(t) arising at t > 1, keep loyal if
served at t− 1 and switch seller if rationed.
Establishing conditional loyalty as an assessment equilibrium is quite
simple.
Proposition 5 In the m × 2 case, along with consistent beliefs it is an
assessment equilibrium for every buyer to adhere to Θm×2.
Proof. Optimality of Θm×2 at t = 1 is immediate. As regards t > 1,
consider first any information set H(t) = (..., hr1(t−1)) (buyer h rationed by
seller 1 at the last stage). Then h infers that bm1(t−1) ≥ λ and bm2(t−1) < λ.
Since all k 6= h are held to obey Θm×2 at t, h expects bm1(t) = λ andbm2(t) = λ − 1. Consequently, h’s subjective service probability is one if
switching seller as prescribed by Θm×2, while being λ/(λ+1) = m/(m+2)
if trying again seller 1. Turn now to any H(t) = (..., hs1(t − 1)). This is
consistent with both bm1(t− 1) ≥ λ and bm1(t− 1) < λ.5 Whatever the case
may be, h expects bm1(t) = λ − 1 and bm2(t) = λ. Therefore, h’s service
probability is one if loyal and m/(m+ 2) if switching to seller 2.
The above proof is so simple, first, because a complete action plan incor-
porating the norm of conditional loyalty is easy to draw and, second, because
subjective service probabilities are easily determined at any information set,
be it on or oﬀ the equilibrium path. Both tasks are much more complex to
accomplish in them×n case. Quite intuitively, the strategy to be checked as
4We do not impose Kreps and Wilson’s requirement of “consistency”. (For doubts
about the cogency of this requirement, see Osborne and Rubistein, 1994, pp. 224-225).
5 Incidentally, it is worth recalling that τ = 1 in the m × 2 case. Conse-
quently, any H(t) = (..., hs1(t − 1)) is on the equilibrium path if and only if H(t) =
(..., hs1(2), h
s
1(3), ..., h
s
1(t− 1)). At any such H(t), structural consistency requires that h’s
belief at date t be bm1(2) = ... = bm1(t− 1) = λ− 1.
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an assessment equilibrium for the general case would contain the following
subset of prescriptions - call it Θ(on)m×n - at information sets on the equilibrium
path: “at t = 1 play σ∗; at t > 1, keep loyal if served at t− 1 and otherwise
visit with equal probability any seller never tried before.”6 At the present
state of our research it remains a conjecture - still to be verified for the gen-
eral m×n case - that adherence to Θ(on)m×n is an assessment equilibrium.7 To
conclude this note, we give just a few hints for such a conjecture. Suppose
H(2) = (hri (1)). Then, assuming the other buyers are adhering to Θ
(on)
m×n,
buyer h expects bmi(2) ≥ λ. SincePj 6=i bmj(2) = λn− 1− bmi(2), this means
that
P
j 6=i bmj(2) < (n−1)λ : unlike seller i, remaining sellers as a whole will
be visited by less buyers than their total capacity can accomodate. This is a
hint for h’s service prospects being better if switching to any j 6= i. Suppose
next H(2) = (hsi (1)). Of course, this is consistent with bmi(1) Q λ as well
as with bmj(1) Q λ for any j 6= i. Then it is immediately inferred that the
number of k 6= h who got served is min{bmi(1),λ− 1} ≤ λ− 1 at seller i and
min{bmj(1),λ} ≤ λ at any j 6= i. Consequently, buyer h anticipates that,
at t = 2, the number of loyal buyers inherited from the preceding stage is
certainly not higher than λ − 1 for seller i and certainly not higher than
λ for any j 6= i.8 This is is a hint for h’s service prospects being better if
keeping loyal to i at t = 2.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Prop. 1. For any s∗ and h, s∗−h is such that bm∗i = λ
for all i ∈ N but one, denoted by j, where bm∗j = λ − 1. Buyer h ’s best
response to s∗−h is clearly sh = s
∗
h = j because πh(s∗h, s∗−h) = 1 whereas
πh(sh 6= j, s∗−h) = λ/(λ + 1) = m/(m + n). Also, no strategy profile s◦
implying mi◦ 6= λ for some i can be an equilibrium. At s◦, mi◦ < λ and
mj
◦ > λ for some i, j ∈ N . Any h : sh◦ = j has clearly failed to make a best
response because πh(sh = i, s−h◦) = 1.
Proof of Prop. 2. Suppose σk = σ∗ for all k 6= h. Then the probability
that bmi out of these buyers choose seller i is µ m− 1bmi
¶¡
1
n
¢bmi ¡n−1
n
¢m−1−bmi .
8
Denote by πh(sh = i,σ∗−h) buyer h’s service probability at i when all k 6= h
play σ∗. Then
πh(sh = i,σ∗−h) =
m−1X
bmi=0
µ
m− 1bmi
¶µ
1
n
¶bmi µn− 1
n
¶m−1−bmi
min
µ
1,
λbmi + 1
¶
.
Since πh(sh = i,σ∗−h) is the same for any i ∈ N , then buyer h does his best
as well by playing σh = σ∗. This applies to all h ∈M.
Proof of part (ii) of Prop. 3. The proof is constructive, showing that
it may be m(t) 6= (λ, ...,λ) for any t ≤ τ . Let just one buyer be rationed
at t = 1 : without loss of generality, m1(1) = λ + 1, mi(1) = λ for i =
2, ..., n− 1, and mn(1) = λ− 1. For notational convenience, the buyers are
labelled increasingly according to their allocation at t = 1. Thus we have
the following allocation at t = 1 :
buyers 1 to λ+ 1 at seller 1;
buyers (i− 1)λ+ 2 to iλ+ 1 at seller i = 2, ..., n− 1;
buyers (n− 1)λ+ 2 to m at seller n.
The buyers to follow (henceforth, the “relevant” buyers) are clearly buy-
ers 1 to (n−1)λ+1 : with all buyers conditionally loyal, those visiting seller
n at t = 1 could never be rationed. Note that m(t) 6= (λ, ...,λ) so long as
the buyer who got rationed at t − 1 has switched to some seller i 6= n at t
so that mi(t) = λ + 1. Now we design circumstances so as to delay, as far
as possible, switching to seller n by the buyer who gets rationed by seller
i. First, who is rationed among the λ+ 1 buyers forthcoming to seller i? It
is assumed that, by chance, it is rationed the buyer who over the past has
been rationed the lowest number of times. In case of ties, the buyer with
the lowest label is assumed to be rationed (this is just for notational sim-
plicity). Second, which seller does the rationed buyer switch to? The odds
are assumed to be that seller i+ 1 is selected if i = 1, ..., n− 2, while seller
1 is selected if i = n − 1 : this, of course, so long as it does not violate the
requirement (in Definition 1) that a rationed buyer switches to any seller he
has never tried before.
Now we study the evolution of play under the above circumstances. At
t = 1 seller 1 rations buyer 1; at t = 2 buyer 1 switches to seller 2 where
buyer λ+2 is rationed; at t = 3 buyer λ+2 switches to seller 3 where buyer
2λ+ 2 is rationed, and so on up to stage n− 1 where buyer (n− 2)λ+ 2 is
rationed by seller n− 1. At stage n this buyer switches to seller 1 and then
a similar sequence of stages takes place along which: seller 1 rations buyer
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2 who at stage n+ 1 switches to seller 2 where buyer λ+ 3 is rationed, and
so on. By now, one understands that by stage t = m−λ+1 all the relevant
buyers (whose number is precisely m− λ+1) have been rationed once over
the past. Also, they are allocated as follows at stage t =(m− λ+ 1) + 1 :
buyers (n− 2)λ+ 2 to (n− 1)λ+ 1 at seller 1;
buyers 1 to λ+ 1 at seller 2;
buyers (i− 2)λ+ 2 to (i− 1)λ+ 1 at seller i = 3, ..., n− 1.
So, the buyers who visited seller i = 1, ..., n− 2 at t = 1 are now visiting
seller i+1, and the buyers who visited seller n− 1 are now visiting seller 1.
Stage t = (m−λ+1)+1 is the first of a second series of m−λ+1 stages at
the end of which all the relevant buyers have been rationed twice over the
past. Similarly as above, at stage t = 2(m− λ+ 1) + 1 we find:
buyers (n− 3)λ+ 2 to (n− 2)λ+ 1 at seller 1;
buyers (n− 2)λ+ 2 to (n− 1)λ+ 1 at seller 2;
buyers 1 to λ+ 1 at seller 3;
buyers (i− 3)λ+ 2 to (i− 2)λ+ 1 at seller i = 4, ..., n− 1.
So, the buyers who at t =(m − λ + 1) + 1 visited seller i = 1, ..., n − 2
are now visiting seller i+1, and the buyers who visited seller n− 1 are now
visiting seller 1. The game proceeds likewise until date τ = (m−λ+1)(n−2)
is reached. Then at stage τ we have:
buyers λ+ 2 to 2λ+ 1 at seller 1;
buyers iλ+ 2 to (i+ 1)λ+ 1 at seller i, for any i = 2, ..., n− 2;
buyers 1 to λ+ 1 at seller n− 1.
Thus we are done since one buyer is still rationed at stage τ . Of course,
m(τ +1) = (λ, ...,λ):9 indeed, by date τ all buyers have been rationed n−2
times over the past. Consequently, buyer 1 (the one rationed by seller n− 1
at τ) has to switch to seller n at t = τ + 1.
9As it must be according to part (i) of Prop. 3.
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